State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Roadway
Express, the Diminishing Privilege Tax
Immunity, and the Movement Toward
Uniformity in Apportionment
Under the prohibition of the commerce clause,1 an enterprise engaging in exclusively interstate business within a state has traditionally
enjoyed immunity from a state tax imposed on the privilege of doing
business in the state.2 It is this constitutionally protected subject of the
tax, the privilege, which is the basis of the immunity;3 the measure, at
least in theory, has not presented constitutional questions, 4 although
the Supreme Court has on occasion given the measure of a tax constitu1 See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878); Developments in
the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Businessi 75 HAkv. L. REv.
953, 1031 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
2 Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts,
268 U.S. 203 (1925); Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903). See
P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 103, 104 (1953); J. HLLERsrEIN,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 193, 194 (2d ed. 1961). For a consideration of the early cases
see Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the
States, 31 HA~v. L. REv. 572 (1918) and Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate
Businesses, 8 LAw. Gumt REv. 429 (1948). The term privilege tax as used in this comment
refers to any tax, regardless of its measure, whose subject is the privilege of doing business
in a state or some variant thereof such as the privilege of doing business in corporate
form in a state. Professor Hartman has described the variety of levies that may be referred
to as a privilege tax: "The term 'privilege tax' as employed by the Supreme Court is somewhat generic and has no fixed or definite meaning. It is given all sorts of appellations
and is imposed for the enjoyment of all sorts of privileges. It may be termed a franchise
tax, or called an excise for the privilege of engaging in certain activities; or the nomenclature may couple 'franchise and excise.' . . . The 'privilege tax' may be an excise on the
privilege of using an article, or the exaction may be tagged an occupation tax, or a
license fee, or simply designated a tax for the privilege of enjoying various sorts of business
activities ..
" P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 97-8 (1953).
3 Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903). The Court said: "No
state can compel a party, individual, or corporation to Pay for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce." Id. at 162.
4 Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 600 (1890). See also Atlantic Refining Co.
v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 26-7 (1937); Karisas City, F.S. & M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 233
(1916); Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87 (1913); P. HARTMAN, STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 114 (1953).
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tional significance by obscuring the distinction between subject and
measure.5
In 1959 the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.Minnesota,6 holding that
the commerce clause was no bar to a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned net income tax imposed on a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the taxing state. At the same time, the
Court reaffirmed Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,7 in which it had
invalidated a Connecticut tax imposed on such a corporation, the tax
having been measured by net income but levied on the privilege of
doing business in the state. Given the holding of Spector, that the
commerce clause forbids the imposition of a state privilege tax-irrespective of its measure-upon a corporation engaged exclusively in
interstate business within the state,8 the Northwestern decision, by its
approval of an impost levied on and measured by income derived from
exclusively interstate activity, gave constitutional weight to a distinction between subject and measure which no longer had any economic
significance. Since the measure of the tax invalidated in Spector 9 was
5 See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 438-40 (1939); New
Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930).
The subject is the legal incidence of a tax. It is the thing or event upon which the
power to tax is based; the measure of a tax is the yardstick to which the rate is applied.
Subject and measure may be distinct as in a privilege tax where the subject is the privilege and the measure is, for example, income; or subject and measure may coincide as in
an income tax where the income is both the subject upon which the tax power is predicated and the basis upon which the amount due is calculated. See Hartman, State Taxation
of Corporate Income From a Multi-State Business, 13 VArw. L. Rxv. 21, 49, 50 (1959); Developments, 75 HARV. L. Rav. 953, 960 (1962).
6 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (together with Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc.). The
Northwestern decision and its aftermath stimulated a great outpouring of legal commentary on many of the current problems in the field of state taxation of interstate
commerce. The most extensive single treatment of both the present condition of the system
of state taxation of interstate commerce and an analysis of the problems involved therein
is the four volume report of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), H.R. REP. Nos. 565 and 952,
89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) [paginated 1-1255, and hereinafter cited as "REPoRT']. In
addition, A Symposium on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051
(1960), Developments, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 953 (1962), and Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multi-State Business, 13 VAND. L. Rav. 21 (1959), survey many of the
contemporary issues in the field.
7 340 U.S. 602 (1951). In Northwestern the Court said: "Moreover, it is beyond dispute
that a State may not lay a tax on the 'privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce,"
citing Spector. 358 U.S. at 458.
8 340 U.S. at 609.
9 The Connecticut statute provided in part: "...
and every other corporation ...
shall pay, annually, a tax or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or
doing business within the state, such tax to be measured by the entire net income as
herein defined .. " CONN. GEN. STAT. § 418(c) (Supp. 1939).
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identical to the measure of the tax given constitutional approval in
Northwestern,10 it was apparent that exclusively interstate commerce
could be taxed if the drafters of a state statute called the tax by the
right name.'1
The business community reacted sharply to Northwestern and subsequent judicial developments which seemed to broaden the states' power
to tax interstate commerce. 12 It feared that the states would utilize the
constitutionally approved avenue of direct income taxation to tax businesses which, up to that time, were free of the levies. 13 Responding to
the pleas of business spokesmen, Congress acted with uncommon haste
by enacting, just seven months after the Northwestern decision, a bill
limiting the scope of the states' power to impose taxes levied on or
measured by net income on interstate businesses. 14 Since the bill was
10 The Minnesota statute provided in part: "An annual tax for each taxable year,
computed in the manner and at the rates hereinafter provided, is hereby imposed upon
the taxable net income for such year . . ." MINN. STAT. § 290.03 (1945).
11 See Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multi-State Business, 13
VAND. L. Rav. 21, 37 (1959). The Supreme Court's imposition of greater restrictions upon
a state's taxing power over interstate commerce when the tax was denominated a privilege
tax, rather than a direct net income tax, was justified in Spector by the following language: "Even though the financial burden on interstate commerce might be the same, the
question whether a state may validly make interstate commerce pay its way depends first
of all upon the constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so." 340 U.S. at 608.
12 RiEpoRT 7; Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal,46 VA. L. Rav. 1051 (1960). Several decisions followed in the wake of Northwestern
either upholding the states' right to impose a direct net income tax on exclusively interstate commerce or refusing to consider taxpayers' complaints over such a tax: ET 9- WNC
Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958), af'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 28
(1959); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 984 (1959); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651,
101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
13 This fear was particularly strong among small and medium sized corporations which
anticipated an increase in the number of diverse, conflicting, and overlapping state income
tax laws. H.R. REP. No. 2013, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966). And it was probably compounded by the uncertainty of what the Supreme Court would do next, since the "tangled
underbrush of past cases," as Justice Clark pointed out in Northwestern, "leaves much
room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States
in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation. This Court alone has handed
down some three hundred full-dress opinions spread through slightly more than that
number of our reports." 358 U.S. at 457-8 (1959).
14 P.L. 86-272, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964). The statute is directed at defining the minimum
intrastate activities required of an interstate corporation before liability for a tax of the
kind sustained in Northwestern obtains. In particular the statute precludes a state from
imposing an income tax upon a business where the only activity within the state is
soliciting orders or using an independent contractor to make sales within the State.
P.L. 86-272 is the first and presently the only federal legislation limiting state taxation
of interstate commerce. The constitutionality of the Act has been challenged in three cases:
International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 154 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902
(1964); Ciba Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964),
and Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d
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admittedly a stopgap measure,' 5 Congress at the same time established
a special subcommittee to consider broadly the problems of state taxation of interstate commerce, and to propose remedial legislation. 16
375 (1965). Smith, Kline & French is typical of all three. In approving the act and
reversing the Oregon Tax Court, which had found the act unconstitutional, 5 State Tax
250-116 (Ore. April 24, 1964), the Oregon Supreme Court held: "A state can levy
Cas.
an income tax upon revenues derived from interstate commerce. This is not because such
tax is in a different area than [sic] congressional power 'to regulate commerce;' it is
because, in the absence of congressional action to the contrary, both the state and federal
legislature can legislate in this area. In the absence of congressional action to the contrary, the only restriction upon the states is judicially imposed,--state action must not
unduly burden interstate commerce. Congress now has acted; its statute is contrary to the
state action; the federal statute is valid and the state statute must yield." 241 Ore. at 60-61,
403 P.2d at 380.
Despite official statements by the Court that denial of certiorari has no meaning, the
failure of the Court to accept the question of the act's constitutionality by denying certiorari
to International Shoe has been commented on as implying either satisfaction with the
finding of constitutionality in the state court, inability to deal with a poorly defined
subject, or a desire for further development by state courts. Barnes, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce: Chaos and New Hope, 16 Wrr. Rys. L. REv. 859, 877 (1965). No
support is available for any one position more than another, but the present status of
federal control of state taxation of interstate commerce is decidedly in favor of constitutionality premised on the commerce clause as in Smith, Kline, & French. In the REPORT,
at 147, the Subcommittee found a favorable constitutional outlook for such legislation,
but not without reservation.
For further discussion of the constitutional problems presented by P.L. 86-272 see, e.g.,
Hellerstein, The Power of Congress to Restrict State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 12
J. TAX. 302 (1960); Roland, Public Law 86-272: Regulation or Raid?, 46 VA. L. REv. 1172
(1960).
15 89th Cong., 2d Sess., House Comm. on the Judiciary, Special Subcomm. on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 11798 at 7 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
16 The scope of the Subcommittee's study, which initially embraced only state income
taxation, was broadened by P.L. 87-17, 15 U.S.C. § 881, to include taxes on capital stock,
sales, use, and gross receipts. The occasion for the broadening of the study was the Supreme
Court's decision in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), in which the Court held
that Florida may require an out-of-state retailer soliciting sales in the state through
independent wholesalers and jobbers to collect the state use tax. REPoRT 9; cf. National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
This comment will be concerned primarily with taxes measured by income (generically
termed income taxes) regardless of their nominal subject and with taxes measured by
capital stock (generically termed capital stock taxes) and usually imposed on the privilege
of doing business (in one form or another) in a state. Since capital stock taxes pose many
of the same basic legal problems as do state income taxes, they may usefully be considered
with income taxes, particularly with respect to the proposed congressional solution to
interstate tax problems which considers them together. H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Tit. I, § 101(1), Tit. II, § 201 (1965). See part III infra.
There are three important similarities between the capital stock and income tax as
applied to interstate commerce. First, every state which permits division of the tax base
among the states apportions the base by a formula, whether net income or capital stock
is to be divided. In either case, the corporation is considered as a totality, with the base
that is associated with that totality prorated among the states. The measure of the tax
(income or capital stock) is not based on some localized aspect of the corporation, such as
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After five years of labor, the congressional subcommittee produced
the most extensive study of virtually all the major aspects of state taxation of interstate businesses in our history.1 But conflicting views as to
the direction that further congressional legislation should take, and
political opposition by the states to all further federal intervention, 18
have thus far blocked congressional action, although a bill did pass the
House in May, 1968.19 Moreover, the congressional activity provoked a
counterreaction among the states, which turned their attention to 'the
voluntary adoption of uniform legislation, 20 in order to obviate what
they feared would be further congressional inroads upon their taxing
powers.
The recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation21 makes even further
inroads into the tax-immune status of exclusively interstate business
activity by undermining the distinction between a privilege tax measured by net income and a direct net income tax. In sustaining the
imposition of New Jersey's privilege tax upon a corporation conducting
exclusively interstate business in the state, the New Jersey court not
the property it owns or the transactions in which it engages, even though the subject
may be. See REP RT 987-8. Second, similar compliance problems are presented by both
taxes both in terms of determining whether any tax liability exists and in calculating
the liability when it does exist. REPoRT 988. Third, some states have already achieved a
degree of internal uniformity between the two taxes through the use of common jurisdictional rules and apportionment formulas. Id.
The chief distinction in the law of the two taxes is that capital stock taxes must be
apportioned for foreign corporations, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinlde, 278 U.S. 460 (1929),
but not for domestic corporations, Kansas City, M. & B.R.R. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916),
while apportionment is required on all impositions of a net income tax.
Sales, use, and gross receipts taxes present problems, many of which are distinct from
those involved in income and capital stock taxes. REPORT 1121-1128.
17 Volumes I and II were dated June 15, 1964; Volume Ill was dated June 30, 1965;
and Volume IV was dated September 2, 1965.
18 Examples of state opposition are found in the Hearings at: 267 et seq. (Nevada), 284
et seq. (Oregon), 450 et seq. (North Carolina), 505 et seq. (Utah), 539 et seq. (Michigan),
548 et seq. (New Mexico), 644 et seq. (South Carolina), 834 et seq. (Georgia), 919 et seq.
(Colorado), 1003 et seq. (Nebraska), 1026 et seq. (Texas), 1219 et seq. (Kansas), 1248 et
seq. (Arizona), 1294 et seq. (Alabama), 1353 et seq. (Maryland), 1516 et seq. (California),
1617 et seq. (Wyoming), 1684 et seq. (Council of State Governments).
19 H.R. 2158 was approved by the House of Representative on May 22, 1968, as the
"Interstate Taxation Act." The original bill, H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), was
never reported out of committee. It was then substantially amended and successfully
reported out of committee as H.R. 16491, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (1966), but it died at the
end of the 89th Congress. H.R. 16491 was then re-introduced verbatim in the 90th Congress, 1st Session as H.R. 2158.
20 The Multi-State Tax Compact and the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act represent the major counter-proposals of the states for voluntary state action rather
than federally-imposed uniformity in state taxation of interstate commerce.
21 50 N.J. 471, 236 A 2d 577 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 745 (1968).
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only suggests that the Supreme Court's decision in Spector no longer
22
characterizes its attitude towards state taxation of interstate commerce,
but it also furnishes an approach to the problem which would confine
Spector's authority, as the opinion asserts, "at the very most, only [to]
the precise statutory situation there found."2 3
Judicial and legislative developments after Northwestern indicate
that the power of the states to tax interstate commerce is being reconsidered and, apparently, redefined. The Roadway Express decision, as
well as two other recent decisions adopting a similar approach to the
problem, 24 suggest a judicial method of broadening state taxing powers
over interstate commerce by delimiting the privilege tax immunity
afforded the exclusively interstate business. The legislative rumblings,
on the other hand, foreshadow greater limitations on the states' taxing
powers in uniform nexus2 5 and apportionment2 6 requirements for state
taxation of interstate commerce.
This comment will examine the Roadway Express case, focusing on
its approach to the constitutional limitations theoretically prohibiting
a state from levying a privilege tax on a corporation conducting exclusively interstate business within the state. It will then examine the
decision's implications for the tax statutes of other states. Finally, it will
consider the proposed state and congressional reforms in the area of
state apportionment of income and capital stock taxes on interstate
businesses, in light of the broadening of state tax power over interstate
commerce. It will emphasize the increasing judicial and legislative
attention being devoted to the question of fairness in the taxation of
interstate commerce.
22 Id. at 487, 236 A.2d at 585.

23 Id.
24 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 877 U.S. 436 (1964); Mid-Valley Pipeline Co.
Tenn. , 431 S.W.2d 277 (1968).
v. King, 25 Nexus refers to the due process requirement that a taxpayer have some relationship
with a state in order to incur tax liability there. "[The] test is whether property was
taken without due process of law, or if paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power
exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities, and benefits given
by a state." Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 485, 444 (1941). See generally Hellerstein,
Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 20 TAx L. Rav. 259 (1965);
Barnes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Nexus and Apportionment, 48 MARQ. L.
Rav. 218 (1964); Hirshberg & Nedry, A Federal Concept of Doing Business, 46 VA. L. REv.
1241 (1960).
26 Apportionment refers to the division by the states of a multi-state corporation's tax
base by means of a formula which uses such factors as payroll, property, and sales receipts
to determine the percentage (for tax purposes) of a corporation's business carried on in a
particular state. Two other methods of dividing a corporation's tax base are also used:
specific allocation and separate accounting. For a discussion of the various methods of
dividing income and their relative significance, see RxsoRT 157-249.
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I. ROADWAY ExPiR.ss
A. The Issues in the Case
The case dealt with the New Jersey corporation business tax 7 as levied
on Roadway Express, a Delaware corporation engaged in interstate
motor freight trucking in the state. Roadway was not authorized to do
business in New Jersey, but carried on substantial activities and owned
property in the state. Roadway operated as a common carrier over a
large portion of the country. Its New Jersey operations mainly consisted
of carrying truckload lots of goods in its over-the-road vehicles to and
from two terminals which it maintained in the state. Roadway made
direct delivery or pickup in its fleet of city trucks to its New Jersey
customers, unless a customer required a full truckload lot, in which case
the over-the-road truck would go directly to or from the customer's
place of business. In no case, however, did Roadway carry freight from
one New Jersey location to another. The volume of these activities in
New Jersey was substantial. In 1960, for example, Roadway's vehicles
traveled over eleven million miles on New Jersey's highways, and
$5,728,000 out of total gross revenues of $71,380,000 (about 8 per cent)
was derived from its business in New Jersey. Roadway had built the
larger of its two New Jersey terminals on land it owned at a total investment of nearly one million dollars; it employed 221 persons there.
Roadway rented the smaller terminal, where it had only two employees.
At its terminals, the corporation serviced and maintained its vehicles
and solicited local business. It paid local property taxes, state motor
vehicle registration fees on its local fleet, and state motor fuel and unemployment compensation taxes, among others. The tax assessed by the
Director on its interstate operations amounted to $7,334.50.
The basic provision of the New Jersey tax statute at issue reads:
Every domestic or foreign corporation which is not hereinafter
exempted shall pay an annual franchise tax.., for the
privilege of having or exercising its corporate franchise in this
State, or for the privilege of doing business, employing or
owning capital or property, or maintaining an office, in this
State. And such franchise tax shall be in lieu of all other State,
county or local taxation upon or measured by intangible personal property used in business by corporations liable to taxa28
tion under this act.

The measure of the tax is apportioned net worth plus apportioned net
29
income.
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-1 et seq. (1960).
28 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-2 (1945).
29 New Jersey employs a three-factor (property, payroll, and receipts) formula in order
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Several issues frequently arising when a corporation seeks immunity
from state taxation either were not contested or were disposed of with
little difficulty in Roadway. No claim was made by Roadway that the
tax was discriminatory, 30 or that there was a risk of multiple taxation, 31
or that there was unfair apportionment. 32 Since the Director conceded
that the levy was a privilege or franchise tax, there was no issue as to
the subject of the tax before the court. And the court found, with a
minimum of discussion, that despite the temporary interruptions in
to compute, in the case of an enterprise conducting multi-state activities, the amount of
the income tax base properly attributable to New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-5, -6
(1960). The amount of the tax is determined by applying the specified rate to the apportioned base. The rate in the tax years in question here was a flat lsA%; this has been
raised to 3V% by [1966] N.J. Acts 134. As for net worth, the greater of either an assetsapportionment formula or the three-factor formula is used, and a low rate of two mills
per dollar on the first $100,000,000 is applied, subject to a minimum tax.
The three-factor formula (the so-called "Massachusetts type') takes an average of the
following three fractions,
(1)In-State property
Total property
(2) In-State payroll
Total payroll
(3) In-State sales (receipts)
Total sales (receipts)
however determined, multiplies it by the base (the income or capital stock to be divided
among the taxing states), and then applies the rate. REPORT 168-9.
30 Discrimination against interstate commerce is unconstitutional if different burdens
are imposed on in-state and out-of-state goods on the face of the taxing statute, Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875), or if the tax, though purporting to treat in-state and
interstate commerce alike, in operation puts interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage, Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887) (one ground of
holding). See generally P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 67-70
(1953); J. HE..LmmREN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 219-20 (2d ed. 1961); Developments, 75
HARV. L. REv. 953, 962-4 (1962).
31 See International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); International Harvester
Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 809 U.S. 33 (1940); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
A tax imposed by a state which in no sense subjected interstate business to an unfair
disadvantage against the state's local business might still be struck down if the risk of
cumulative taxation from other states imposing a similar tax would subject the business
in question to a tax burden not borne by local business. See generally J. HEU.ERMIN,
STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 161-3 (2d ed. 1961); P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 69 (1953); Developments, 75 HARv. L. REv. 953, 964-5.
32 Both due process clause and commerce clause objections may be raised to challenge
an allegedly improper apportionment scheme. The due process clause forbids extraterritorial taxation so that if an apportionment formula results in taxation of a larger
portion of the applicable base than is properly attributable to a state, the Court will
strike it down on due process grounds. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n,
390 U.S. 317 (1968); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904). Although the issue under the
commerce clause, given a constitutionally authorized subject of a tax, is whether an
undue burden has been imposed on the commerce, the criteria under this clause for a
valid apportionment formula appear to be fundamentally the same as those under the due
process clause. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 n.5 (1968).
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Roadway's shipping operations in the state, "[a]ll the freight traffic with
which the New Jersey terminals were concerned must be said to be
interstate in character." 33 Consequently, the tax could not be upheld
on the basis that Roadway did some intrastate business.3 4
The issue squarely facing the court, then, was whether a fairly allocated and nondiscriminatory franchise or privilege tax could constitutionally be imposed upon a foreign corporation doing exclusively interstate business in the state. Unless the court construed the tax solely as
an "in lieu of" property tax on Roadway's intangibles in order to bring
it within the principle of Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia 5a difficult task in the light of the court's unqualified characterization of
the tax as a privilege levy-Spector would seem to have dictated the
invalidation of the levy as an interference with the tax-immune privilege of doing interstate business.
B. The Opinion
A unanimous court, speaking through Judge Hall, upheld the levy.
The decision was based on three independent propositions, each of
which theoretically would have been sufficient for sustaining the tax:
first, the privileges taxed by the New Jersey statute are distinguishable
from the privilege of doing business, which was the subject of the tax
in the Connecticut levy at issue in Spector,3 6 second, the minority
83 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Director, 50 NJ. at 479, 236 A.2d at 581 (1967).
34 See City of Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953); Norton Co. v. Dep't of
Revenue of Ill., 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
35 358 U.S. 434 (1959). In the first Railway Express case, Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia tax imposed
on a taxpayer engaged in exclusively interstate business in Virginia, holding that it was a
privilege tax within the meaning of Spector, and therefore could not be constitutionally
applied to a business exclusively interstate. Virginia then amended its statute to read:
"each express ... company... shall ... pay to the State, a franchise tax which shall be
in lieu of taxes upon all of its other intangible property and in lieu of property taxes on
its rolling stock." VA. CODE § 58-546 et seq. (1950), as amended by [1956] Va. Acts 612.
The second Railway Express case, Railway Express, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959),
which upheld the new levy as applied to an exclusively interstate business, said, in
pertinent part: "The new tax is not denominated a license tax laid on the 'privilege of
doing business in Virginia' . . . .The General Assembly has made crystal-dear that the
tax is . . 'in lieu of taxes upon all of its other intangible property... 1 Id. at 438.
The Court has sustained a number of gross receipts taxes levied on railroads, express
companies, and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce on the basis that these
taxes are not actually imposed directly on interstate commerce or on the tax-immune
privilege of doing exclusively interstate business in a state, but that they are "in lieu of"
property taxes which could legitimately be imposed on the enterprise in question. Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S.
688 (1895); Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 US. 217 (1891). See generally J. HELLr.STEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 215-6 (2d. ed. 1961); P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 183-7 (1953).
36 See note 9 supra.
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opinion in Spector represents the present posture of the Supreme Court
towards state taxation of interstate business; third, the tax is a levy in
lieu of other state taxes which could be validly imposed on exclusively
interstate business. This comment will deal only with the first two
aspects of the opinion. Although the "in lieu" feature of the tax may
have been controlling in the Supreme Court's dismissal of Roadway's
appeal for lack of a substantial federal question,3 7 the major significance
of the decision lies in its direct attack on tax immunity derived from the
privilege of doing interstate business.
Judge Hall's opinion distinguishes the incidence of the New Jersey
privilege levy from the incidence of the privilege levy at issue in Spector.
The opinion points to privileges taxed under the New Jersey statute
which are not found in the Connecticut tax. While the Connecticut
levy is a franchise tax imposed on the "privilege of carrying on or doing
business within this state,"38 the New Jersey tax embraces not only the
privilege of doing business, but also the privileges of exercising a corporate franchise, owning property, employing capital and maintaining
an office.3 9 The court concludes that a "franchise tax may be imposed
[upon an exclusively interstate business] if the incidence or basis is a
privilege other than engaging in that business as such .... ,,40 Since only
the privilege of engaging in business "as such" was within the constitutional privilege announced in Spector, a state remains free to tax an
exclusively interstate business as long as, in the precise language of the
statute, the levy is not imposed solely on the privilege of doing business
in the state.
Having found a semantic solution to the issue before the court,41
Judge Hall suggests a second and more fundamental basis for sustaining
the New Jersey tax:
While a tax basis worded as is New Jersey's has never been
passed upon by the nation's highest court, we earnestly believe
that the current course of its opinions in the field, as we read
them, points to the conclusion that this levy is valid as applied
42
to exclusively interstate business.
37 390 U.S. 745 (1968).
38 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 418(c) (Supp. 1939).
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-1 et seq. (1945).
40 50 N.J. at 489, 236 A.2d at 586.

41 The triumph of form over substance is emphasized by Judge Hall's remark, referring
to the New Jersey tax: "There seems to be no question that, if it had been enacted and
denominated as a direct corporate income tax, it would have been validly applicable to
the taxpayers here by virtue of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of
Minnesota .... " Id. at 485, 236 A.2d at 584.
42 Id. at 485-6, 236 A.2d at 584-5.
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Three post-Spector opinions of the Supreme Court support this proposition. Northwestern approved a state income tax levied on the income
from an exclusively interstate business.4" The second Railway Express
case approved a state "in lieu" tax on an exclusively interstate business.44 And the recent decision in General Motors Corp. v. State of
Washington45 approved a state privilege tax on the gross receipts from
interstate selling traditionally regarded as exclusively interstate commerce 46 because there were sufficient "local incidents" to warrant the
levy.47 Furthermore, there is additional support for Judge Hall's proposition in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,48 decided three years
before Spector, in which the Supreme Court approved a tax on the
maintenance of property within the state by a corporation doing exclusively interstate commerce in the state. Taken together, these four
decisions substantially narrow the tax immunity which had seemingly
been accorded the privilege of engaging in exclusively interstate activity,49 emphasizing that "the founders did not intend to immunize such
commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of the state government in return for the benefits it derives from within the state." 50 By
chipping away at the protection Spector seemed to give interstate
business, the Memphis Gas and General Motors cases in particular illustrate the tendency of the Court to fragment the privilege of doing
business in sustaining a state tax on significant components of exclusively interstate activity.
In the Memphis Gas case, Mississippi had levied its franchise tax51
on the Memphis Natural Gas Company, a Delaware corporation which
owned and operated a pipe line in the state, although not authorized
to do business there. The corporation had only one customer in the
taxing state; its only employees were those necessary to maintain the
line; and it was stipulated that the company "has never engaged in any
intrastate commerce in Mississippi." 52 In sustaining the levy over the
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959). The decision was handed
down on the same day as the Northwestern decision.
45 377 U.S. 436.
46 See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachussetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
47 377 U.S. at 447 (1964).
48 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
49 See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi v.
Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts,
268 U.S. 203 (1925).
5o Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-2 (1959).
51 Miss. CoDE, § 9314 (1942).
52 Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 81 (1948).
43
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taxpayer's objection that its imposition violated the commerce clause,
the Court accepted the Mississippi Supreme Court's construction of the
statute as
an exaction . . . as a recompense for its protection of .
the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and
otherwise in manning the facilities of the system throughout
the 135 miles of its line in this State, 53
and dismissed as "idle" the suggestion that the tax was imposed on "the
privilege of engaging in interstate business." 54 According to the Court,
the privilege did not prevent an activity admittedly essential to the
conduct of an interstate business from being classified as a "local activity" for purposes of state taxation.rl
The Court in GeneralMotors, as in Memphis Gas, by isolating various
facets of interstate activity, sustained a Washington privilege tax
measured by gross receipts from interstate sales.5 6 General Motors, a
Delaware corporation, manufactured vehicles and parts outside Washington which it sold to retail dealers in the state. It maintained a small
branch office and warehouses in the state, employed forty in-state personnel, and sent its out-of-state personnel into the state from time to
time. While reaffirming that "a state may not lay a tax on the 'privilege'
of engaging in interstate commerce,"5 7 the Court said that Washington
was merely trying to tax "other activities or aspects of this [interstate]
business which, unlike the privilege of doing interstate business, are
subject to the sovereign power of the state."5 8 Whatever the privilege of
engaging in interstate business may be, these "local incidents" were
apparently not within its ambit since they were "sufficient to form the
basis for a levy of a tax that would not run contrary to the Constitution." 59
Roadway Express is a logical extension of the reasoning of both

Memphis Gas and General Motors. The New Jersey court, using a
technique parallel to that of the Supreme Court, spelled out certain
activities which it did not consider within the privilege of doing business, namely, the exercise of a corporate franchise, the ownership of
property, the employment of capital, and the maintenance of an office
within a state. Similar reasoning has been used in other state decisions.
5 Stone v. Memphis Natural Gas. Co., 201 Miss. 670, 674, 29 So. 2d 268, 270 (1947).
54 Memphis Natural Gas
55 Id. at 87.
56 General Motors Corp.
57

Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 85 (1948).
v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).

Id. at 446.

58 Id. at 447. Insert is found in the original text.
59 Id.

at 448.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court, for example, neatly avoided the impact
of the Spector case on its corporate franchise tax by holding that, despite
the Supreme Court's proscription in Spector of a levy on the right to do
interstate business, "[t]he right to do business in corporateform was not
involved in the [Spector] case." 60 A recent decision handed down by the
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (in a case whose facts are almost identical
to those of Roadway Express) sustained Ohio's franchise tax on an
exclusively interstate business, holding that since, in addition to the
doing of business in the state, "the tax is based disjunctively on 'owning
or using a part or all of its capital or property in this state,' "61 it was
therefore not a tax on the privilege of doing business within the meaning of Spector.
II. THE STATE

STATUTES

Judge Hall's opinion in Roadway Express, if followed by other state
courts, could have wide repercussions in extending state taxation of
interstate business. In state after state, the standard tax services, relying
on Spector, indicate that any corporation doing an entirely interstate
business will not be subject to state franchise or privilege taxes.6 2 The
following brief survey and analysis of the state tax statutes suggest the
implications that Roadway Express might have concerning this supposed immunity.
A significant number of states are affected by the Roadway Express
analysis. Of the forty states6 3 which have taxes measured by corporate
income, thirty-four have direct income taxes in which income is both
the subject and the measure of the tax. 64 These thiry-four states may
60 Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 123, 129, 270 S.W.2d 384, 387,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954). See Mid-Valley Pipeline Co. v. King, -Tenn..-,
431 S.W.2d 277 (1968).
61 Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Porterfield (B.TA. No. 64747, 10-3-67), P-H State and Local
Taxes, Ohio
17,008.
62 See, e.g., P-H State and Local Taxes, 1 All States Unit
92,222.
03 Although the Distict of Columbia imposes a tax on the privilege of doing business
in or receiving sources of income from the District, D.C. CODE § 47-1580 (West, 1968), it will
not be considered here since the commerce clause restrictions applicable to the states are
not similarly applicable to Congress in legislating for the District. Neild v. District of
Columbia, 110 F.2d 246 (1940). Hence, Spector would not limit the District of Columbia's
power to tax exclusively interstate business activity.
64 ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 398 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.010(b) (1962); Aiuz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 43-102 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2004 (1960); CALIM. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 23151,
23501 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-3 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902
(Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102 (Supp. 1967): HAWAII Rxv. LAws §§ 121-23(a) (Supp.
1965); IDARO CODE ANN. §§ 63-3025, 3025A (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-3219 (Supp.
1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3203(b) (Supp. 1965); Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 141.040
(1963); LA. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 47:31 (Supp. 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81 § 288(b) (Supp.
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constitutionally impose their levies upon an exclusively interstate business under the principle of Northwestern. The five states (and New
Jersey) using income as a measure only, impose their levies upon the
privilege of doing business or of carrying on certain specified activities
within the state. 5 These five states are of interest here since their
provisions are comparable to those of New Jersey.
A privilege tax measured by the value of a corporation's capital
stock66 is levied by thiry-seven states, Since seven states impose this tax
only on domestic corporations, 67 and eight states impose it only on
domestic corporations and foreign corporations which have formally
been authorized to do business in the state, 8 it is only the other twentytwo states which in theory, at least, impose their capital stock tax on all
interstate corporations, and which are the concern of this comment. 69
1967); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 63, § 39 (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7557 (132) (Supp.
1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 290.02, 290.03 (1962); MIss. CODE ANN. § 9220-03(2) (Supp.
1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.040.1 (1952); NEB. SESSION LAws, 1967, ch. 487, § 34(l); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-6 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130-3 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENr.
CODE §§ 57-38-11, 57-38-30 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2304 (1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 317.070(1), 318.020 (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3420c, 3420n-3 (Supp.
1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-11-2 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-222 (1962); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 59-13-3, 59-13-65 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5832 (Supp. 1968);
VA. CODE ANN. § 58-128 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-24-4 (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 71.01(1) (Supp. 1968).
Seven of these thirty-four state statutes are of the so-called "double-barrel" type, in that
the state supplements its franchise tax measured by net income with a direct net income
tax. Liability for the income tax obtains only to the extent that the franchise tax is
inapplicable as it is in the case of an enterprise conducting exclusively interstate business
in the state. In this situation, the income tax, under the principle of Northwestern, could
be validly levied on the corporation. The states with this kind of "double-barrelled" levy
are: California, Idaho, Massachussetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
65 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-214 (Supp. 1968); IowA CODE ANN. § 422.33 (1968); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 54:10A-2, 54:10A-5 (1960, Supp. 1967); N.Y. TAx LAW § 209 (1966); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-2701 (Supp. 1968).
Montana imposes an excise tax in the form of a "license fee" for carrying on business
within the state, but it is essentially a privilege tax measured by net income. MONT. REv.
CODE ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1967).
66 Such a tax must be apportioned to the taxing state in the case of a foreign corporation. See supra note 16.
67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 501, 503 (1966); ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit, 36, § 2401 (1964);
vRV.
STAT.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 197 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 294:117 (1955); ORE.
§ 57.767(1) (1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-12-1 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-456 (1950).
68 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-183 (1947); COLO. REv. STAT. § 31-10-7 (1963); IDAHO CODE
§§ 30-602, 30-603 (1967); ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 157,131, 157.138 (Supp. 1967); IOWA CODE
§§ 496A.126, 496A.127 (Supp. 1968); S.C. CODE §§ 65-602, 65-606 (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 17-46 (1957).
Washington imposes its capital stock tax only on those foreign corporations doing or
seeking to do intrastate business in the state. The levy may therefore be considered in the
same category as the levies noted immediately above since there is no attempt to tax the
exclusively interstate business.
69 ALA. CODE tit. 51, §§ 347, 348 (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-214. 12-219

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:186

Although the capital stock tax (whether denominated a privilege or a
direct net income tax) is not as important a source of state revenue as
the corporate income tax,70 the legal problems involved in the imposition of these excise taxes on an exclusively interstate business are
the same. Therefore, no distinction will be made between an income
and a capital stock measure in considering the implications of Roadway
7
Express upon the twenty-seven state statutes in question. '
The Privilegeof Having or ExercisingIts CorporateFranchisein This
State: Louisiana,72 New York, 73 Tennessee.7 4 Roadway Express is au§ 608.33(1) (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-2401 (Supp. 1967); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-702 (1963); Ky. R Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 136.070, 186.072 (1963); LA. Rxv.
STAT. § 47:601 (1955); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 63, § 39 (Supp. 1967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.205
(Supp. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-9314, 37-9317 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 10.147.010
(Supp. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-303, 21-306 (1962); N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:10A-5 (Supp.
1967); N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 209.1, 210 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-114, 105-122(b) (Supp.
1967); OHIo REV. CODE §§ 5733.01, 5733.05 (1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1201, 1209
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 1871(b), 1901 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2902,
67-2904 (Supp. 1968); TEx. Civ. STAT. tit. 122A, art. 12.01(1) (Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE
(1958); FLA. STAT.

§ 11-12-80.
70 REPORT

909.

71 The procedure employed in categorizing the statutes was as follows: every alternative

basis for the imposition of the tax was considered independently; if a statute fit into more
than one category it would be placed in both of them with this exception: if one of the
categories was specifically the privilege of doing business, the other category or categories
only would be considered since they would necessarily be less restrictive. When the
language of the New Jersey statute did not adequately describe a category, the language of
the first state listed has been used.
72 LA. REv. STAT. § 47:601 (1955).
73 N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 209, 210 (1966).
74 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2701, -2902, -2904, -2908 (Supp. 1968). Tennessee's attempts to
tax exclusively interstate business have had a particularly interesting and relevant
history. Because the Tennessee State Constitution forbids a general direct tax on net
income [TENN. CONsT. art. II, § 28], Tennessee has had a privilege tax measured by net
income. Before section 67-2701 was amended in 1955, it was held that the tax was on the
privilege of doing business in corporate form, distinguishable from the Connecticut statute
in Spector, and consequently applicable to a foreign corporation doing business in
Tennessee, even though engaged in exclusively interstate commerce there. Texas Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 123, 270 S.V.2d 384, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883
(1954). However, in the Texas Gas case, the corporation had qualified to do business in
Tennessee, so that it was still unclear whether an unqualified corporation doing exclusively interstate business would be subject to the levy. In 1955, the Tennessee Legislature
amended the statute and made it dear that whether a business actually qualified or not
made no difference since the tax was a "recompense for the protection of its local activities
and as compensation for the benefits it receives from doing business in Tennessee." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-2701 (Supp. 1968). Since the tax was still on the privilege of doing business,
however, it remained unclear whether an exclusively interstate corporation not qualified
to do business in the state was taxable. REPORT 346.
In August 1968, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the state's privilege tax on a
corporation doing exclusively interstate business in the state, taking an approach almost
identical to the New Jersey Court's opinion in Roadway Express, from which it quoted
extensively. Mid-Valley Pipeline Co. V. King, Tenn. , 431 S.W.2d 277 (1968). The
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thority for the proposition that a tax may be imposed on the exercise
of a corporate franchise, even though the corporation exercising that
franchise is doing exclusively interstate business.1 5 By pointing to this
phrase in the New Jersey statute as one of the alternative bases of the
tax, Judge Hall was in effect making the point that the privilege of
doing business is distinguishable from the privilege of doing business
in the corporate form. Doing business in the corporate form is only one
of the many ways in which one may engage in interstate business. To
tax only one particular form of engaging in interstate business is no
more to tax the entire privilege than is the taxation of the local incidents of interstate business a tax upon the entire privilege. 76
7
The Privilegeof Owning Capital or Property in This State: Florida,
Kentucky, 78 Louisiana,9 Michigan,80 Ohio,8 ' Pennsylvania,82 Texas.8 3

According to Roadway Express, the privilege of owning property or
employing capital in a state may likewise be distinguished from the
privilege of carrying on interstate business.8 4 A foreign manufacturing
corporation, for example, may send salesmen into a state and solicit a
substantial volume of business there without the aid of any local capital
or property. In specifying certain activities, such as the ownership or use
of local property, the state legislature may be consciously attempting to
single out for taxation those local activities which, though an essential
plaintiff was a foreign corporation engaged in transporting crude oil from points in
Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas to points in Kentucky and Ohio by a pipeline passing
through Tennessee. It had not qualified to do business in Tennessee and employed only
four people there-two pumping station foremen and two communication technicians.
Although the taxpayer's business was solely interstate, the court held that the taxpayer
was engaged in sufficient local activities-maintenance of pumping stations and microwave
towers by employees residing in Tennessee, and contracting for service and acquiring title
to property in its corporate name-to provide a basis for the imposition of the franchise
and excise taxes. Such local activities, although incidental to the conduct of interstate
commerce were held to be taxable on the basis of the reasoning in the Memphis Gas
and Roadway Express decisions. The court said in part:
The fact complainant is and has been solely engaged in interstate commerce
within this State is not determinative . . . [T]he privileges taxed in Spector
under the Connecticut statute were confined to those of 'carrying on or doing
business within the state . .. ' [T]he taxes are imposed upon the privilege of doing
business in corporate form and are nondiscriminatory as they apply to all foreign
corporations doing business in this State in corporate form.
431 S.W.2d at 280, 283 (1968).
Id. at -,
75 50 N.J. at 491-2, 236 A.2d at 588.

General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 447 (1964).
§ 608.33(1) (Supp. 1968).
78 Ky. Rav. STAT. §§ 136.070, 136.072 (1963).
79 LA. REV. STAT. § 47:601 (1963).
80 Micu. STAT. ANN. § 21.205 (Supp. 1968).
81 OHIo REv. CoDE §§ 5733.01, 5733.05 (1967).
82 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 1871(b), 1901 (Supp. 1967).
83 T x. Civ. STAT. tit. 122A, art. 12.01(1) (Supp. 1967).
84 50 N.J. at 492, 236 A.2d at 588.
76

7'7 FLA. STAT.
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part of interstate commerce, are nevertheless "apart from the flow of
coimamerce," 8 5 to use the language of the Memphis Gas case, and therefore not protected by the tax immunity granted to the privilege of doing
interstate business.
Having One or More Individuals Receiving Compensation in This
State: Kentucky,8 6 Michigan.s It is certainly possible to conceive of
conducting an interstate business in a state without employing personnel there. For example, interstate trucking companies may conduct
operations in a state without any locally employed personnel. It is only
when a business enterprise is personally represented in a state, with its
personnel enjoying the protection of its police and public facilities, that
the state imposes a tax. The reasoning in Roadway Express would suggest that this is not a tax on the privilege of doing business but rather
a levy on a distinct privilege of a particularly local character and therefore taxable, though part of interstate activity.
Similar analyses of the remaining state statutes yield similar results.,,
B. Evaluation of the Roadway Express Approach
Although, as the above analysis seems to demonstrate, it may be possible to distinguish many existing state statutes from the statute at issue
in Spector through semantic exercises, the result would be to turn
the privilege of doing business into an abstraction without substance.
85 Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96 (1948).
86 Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 136.070, 136.072 (1963).
87 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.205 (Supp. 1968).
88 Some of the other more common statutory provisions are "doing business in the
state," ALA. CODE tit. 51, §§ 347, 348 (Supp. 1967), FLA. STAT. § 608.33(1) (Supp. 1968), IowA
CODE ANN. § 422.33 (1949), LA. REV. STAT. § 47:601 (1955), Mo. REv. STAT. § 10.010, 10.147
(Supp. 1966), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-13-2 (Supp. 1967), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-114, 105-122(b)
(Supp. 1967), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2701, 67-2902, 67-2904 (Supp. 1968); "recompense for
the benefit and protection afforded by the government and laws of the state for the activities carried on within the state," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-214, 12-219 (1958), TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 67-2701 (Supp. 1968); "the privilege of carrying on its business within this
state," GA. CODE ANN. § 92-2401 (Supp. 1967), MoT. REv. CODE ANN. § 84-1501 (Supp. 1958).
Although these provisions are in many ways much closer or nearly identical to those
at issue in Spector, it is possible to distinguish each state statute from that of Connecticut.
The language of "recompense" in the Tennessee and Connecticut (revised after Spector)
statutes, for example, points to certain activities which receive the benefit of state laws
and government, even though these activities may be part of the exclusively interstate
business carried on in the state. And while it may appear untenable at first blush to try
to draw a distinction between a tax on doing business and a tax on the privilege of doing
business, there is nevertheless an argument to be made if one carries Judge Hall's reasoning
in Roadway Express to its logical extreme: If the question of constitutionality of a tax
on interstate commerce depends on whether the statute imposes a levy on the privilege
of doing business as such, a tax on the doing of business may be construed by a court to
embrace those activities, such as the maintenance of local property, which are distinct from
the privilege of engaging in interstate business as such, and are therefore taxable.
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In effect, the battle over the meaning and extent of the constitutionally
protected privilege of doing business in a state is being fought on conceptual quicksand. The cases,8 9 by seizing on one "taxable" aspect of
the privilege, such as the maintenance of local property or the exercise
of a corporate franchise, actually destroy the entire concept. While
there is a theoretical distinction between the privilege of doing business
and the privilege of doing business in corporate form, it is a distinction
which emasculates the commerce clause protection afforded interstate
business which is by and large carried on by corporations.9 0 While it
may be possible to carry on an interstate business without owning property or employing capital in a state, to limit the protection of the commerce clause to those that do not is to limit its protection to only a small
minority of businesses. And while there may be a verbal distinction
between the tax-immune privilege of doing business and its taxable
local incidents, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court will
reverse any state court finding that there are sufficient local incidents to
justify the distinction and, consequently, the imposition of its privilege
tax. If the privilege of doing interstate business has any meaning, its
protection certainly cannot be limited to the unincorporated association
owning no property in a state where it has no employees.
Roadway Express represents a rejection of the privilege concept as a
constitutional standard in controversies involving state taxation of
interstate commerce. Either it is saying that the privilege of doing interstate business considered as a whole cannot be taxed, but that its component parts, such as the ownership of property or the exercise of a corporate franchise, can be taxed; or it is saying that the privilege of doing
business cannot be taxed, but that the activities that constitute the
normal conduct of interstate business, such as employing capital in a
state and doing business in the corporate form, are not part of that
privilege. Such reasoning erodes the privilege and implies that the
decisions of the Supreme Court in this field spring from considerations
which the language of its opinions tends only to obscure.
The fundamental policy issue underlying these developments is
whether there remains any justification for continuing to grant the
abstract privilege of carrying on interstate business whatever tax immunity it still enjoys. Three considerations in particular suggest that
89 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Memphis Natural Gas Co.
v. Stone, 35 U.S. 80 (1948); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Director, 50 N.J. 471, 236 A.2d 577
(1967); Mid-Valley Pipe Line Co. v. King, - Tenn. -, 481 S.W.2d 277 (1968).
90 The Report indicated: "When the total of all manufacturing and mercantile activity
is taken into account, it is found that while corporations comprised only 17 percent of
about 3 million business units, they reported 82 percent of all business receipts and 75
percent of all net income originating in these industries." REPORT 17.
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there does not. First, since the Supreme Court approved the imposition
of a state's net income tax on an exclusively interstate business in
Northwestern, there is no longer any economic justification for the
perpetuation of the tax immunity granted the privilege of doing an
interstate business, when the tax is measured by net income. 91 Second,
the narrow privilege immunity expands and contracts according to
semantic variations in state statutes and the ingenuity of state courts.
Third, barring any problem of discrimination, multiple burdens, or
insufficient nexus, there is no reason why a state should not be permitted to collect revenue from every business which enjoys the benefits
and protection which the state affords those enterprises owning local
property, employing local personnel, or exploiting the local market. 92
Furthermore, as long as interstate corporations are not subjected to a
tax on more than one hundred per cent of their tax base as a result of
inconsistent state apportionment formulas and as long as the corporation in question has a sufficient connection with the taxing state to
justify tax liability, to continue to provide interstate businesses with
tax immunity would tend to put the taxable local business at a competitive disadvantage.93
Taxation of the privilege of doing interstate business would be only
the first step in moving towards a more rational reconciliation of conflicting interests: that of the states in obtaining sorely needed revenue
from interstate business and that of the nation in protecting the free
flow of commerce among the states. While hard questions remain, they
lie not in ethereal distinctions but in the extent of the nexus which will
be required before interstate business may be subjected to the state
taxing power, in the standardization of apportionment formulas in the
fifty states, and in the difficulties of administration and compliance costs
involved in multi-state taxation.
III. PROPOSED REFORMS OF STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND THE APPORTIONMENT CONTROVERSY

Both judicial and legislative developments stemming from the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern suggest that the critical issue in
91 The only basis on which immunity from a tax imposed on the privilege of doing
an interstate business but measured by net income could now be justified for the exclusively interstate business is the subject-measure distinction which becomes unsatis-

factory when it has no relationship to the economic incidence of the tax.
92 See Hellerstein, An Academician's View of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
16 TAx L. REv. 159, 161 (1961).
93 See P. Hartman, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 117-121 (1953). Undertaxation of the interstate corporation is as discriminatory as overtaxation, for the intrastate corporation would be subject to higher taxation than the interstate corporation
operating within the state. See Note, State Taxation of Multistate Businesses, 74 YALE LJ.
1259 (1965).
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state taxation of interstate commerce is how interstate commerce may
be taxed rather than whether it may be taxed at all.94 The Northwestern
decision itself strongly intimated, despite its apparent affirmation of
Spector,95 that the significant constitutional criteria for evaluating a
state tax on interstate commerce are whether the tax is "apportioned
[so as not to] ... 'discriminate against or prohibit the interstate activities
or... place the interstate commerce at a disadvantage relative to local
commerce' "90 and whether it is "properly apportioned to local activities
within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support [its imposi97
tion]."
In considering the impact of the proposed reforms of state taxation
of interstate commerce, it is important to note that the congressional
bill, unlike the state proposals, is severely limited in scope. The Willis
Bill (officially proposed as the Interstate Taxation Act) excludes from
its scope all corporations with an average annual income of over
$1,000,000.98 In addition, the bill excludes corporations in the trans-

portation, communications, insurance, and banking industries as well
as some public utilities. 9 While many of the excluded corporations are
in industries already subject to substantial federal and state regulation,
the $1,000,000 ceiling on the income of included corporations will
effectively exempt a large part of the states' revenue sources from the
protection of the bill, thus leaving the states free to tax these corporations as they do at the present. In short, many of the controversies which
have plagued state taxation of interstate commerce for years-the problem of the large multi-state manufacturer, of the interstate gas or pipeline company, of the interstate transportation company-will continue
to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis much as before, subject to the
limitations imposed by the states on their own methods of taxation.
94 Two recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the apportionment problem (see text
at notes 115-129, infra), General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965),

and Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968), the Interstate Taxation Act, H.R. 2158, dealing with a broad range of problems including nexus
and apportionment, and the Multi-State Tax Compact, which also proposes a uniform
solution to such problems as apportionment, are some indications of this new focus. More
specifically, H.R. 2158 proposes to eliminate, for those corporations covered by the bill,
the distinction between a direct net income tax and a franchise tax measured by net
income; in addition, it proposes to broaden privilege tax liability to those corporations,
covered by the bill, which are engaged in exclusively interstate commerce. In short, the
bill proposes to eliminate the tax immunity granted the privilege of doing interstate
business. See H.R. 2158, § 501.
95 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
90 Id. at 462, quoting Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 670 (1948).
97 Id. at 452.
98 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 506(3) (1968).
9D Id. §§ 506(1), (2).
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A. Nexus
The nexus issue is distinct from and logically antecedent to the
problem of apportionment. Before a state may impose any tax on a
foreign corporation or a non-resident, it must demonstrate some minimum connection between the state and the taxpayer or transaction
taxed. 100 The first congressional attempt to deal with the nexus issue1 0 1
was limited essentially to lessening the impact of the Northwestern
decision on interstate commerce. In effect it forbade a state from
imposing a tax measured by net income from the sale of tangibles when
the taxpayer's only activity in the state was solicitation of orders for the
taxpayer or its customers. 02 More comprehensive is the "business location" test embodied in the proposed Interstate Taxation Act, 0 3 which
emerged from the Willis Subcommittee's recommendations 04 and was
before Congress during the last session. The imposition of standard
minimum nexus requirements on the states' taxing power would be a
significant move towards uniformity in this area.
The nexus provisions of the bill represent a compromise between the
interests of the states and those of interstate business. The states have
generally resisted all congressional action restricting their tax jurisdiction, including P.L. 86-272 and the various versions of the Willis
Bill. 10 5 The business community, on the other hand, dissatisfied with
what it regards as the narrowness of existing limitations on state taxing
power, has urged congressional action to restrict state jurisdiction to
tax further by the adoption of broad permanent establishment or business location tests of jurisdiction.) 0 It would restrict state taxation
by excluding selling offices, inventories, warehouses, research installations, or buying offices from the definitions of such locations, depending
100 See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 352-7
(1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 308,
313 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting); Barnes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Nexus
and Apportionment, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 218, 220-1 (1964); Developments, 75 HARv. L. REV.
953, 961-2 (1962).
101 P.L. 86-272, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964).
102 Id. See note 14 supra.
103 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 101 (1968) adopts the "business location" test as
part of the uniform jurisdictional standard. A person is considered to have a business
location within a state if that person "(1) owns or leases real property within the State or
(2) has one or more employees located in the State." Id. § 511.
104 REPORT 1133-1212.
105 See note 18 supra.
106 Examples of the business community's attitude towards the nexus provisions of the
Interstate Taxation Act can be found in the Hearings at: 55 et seq. (National Association
of Wholesalers); 824 et seq. (Empire State Chamber of Commerce); 384 et seq. (Illinois
Manufacturers' Association); 406 et seq. (Illinois State Chamber of Commerce); 441 et seq.
(Associated Industries of New York State, Inc.).
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upon the particular business interest in question. The actual nexus
provision of the bill adopts a jurisdictional standard which restricts
existing state taxing powers, but nevertheless employs a business location test more favorable to the states' jurisdiction to tax than many
business spokesmen had urged. 107
B. Apportionment
It is in the area of apportionment, however, that the most complex
problems remain. After four years of intensive study of the various
methods'0 8 employed by the states to assign the taxing state its fair
107 Hearings 1133 et seq. On October 28, 1968, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.)
urged that the Interstate Taxation Act "be made a priority matter early in the 91st
Congress." 114 CONe. Re. E9481 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1968). He also urged that the $1,000,000
ceiling on the average annual income of those corporations subject to the provisions of
the Act be removed insofar as nexus is concerned. It is to be noted, however, that Senator
Ribicoff, in his apparent attempt to increase the effective uniformity to be achieved by
the Act, was not persuaded to suggest a similar change with respect to the apportionment
provisions of the Act.
108 The three methods employed are: (1) separate accounting; (2) specific allocation of
particular categories of income; and (3) formula apportionment of income. See generally
REPORT 157-249. With separate accounting, a corporation's activities within the taxing state
are regarded as though they were carried on by a distinct in-state entity, and income is
computed for this hypothetical entity without reference to the remainder of the corporation's activities. REPORT 160. With specific allocation, certain classes of income are regarded
as nonapportionable (with special rules governing each such class), and it involves, more
than the other two methods of dividing income, a direct attempt to determine the
geographical source of particular income items. REPoRT 197. Specific allocation represents
an effort to single out items of income that lend themselves to precise geographical location, whereas separate accounting represents an effort to single out part of a corporation.
REPORT 248. Precise separate accounting is inapplicable in the many instances when a
corporation's activities cannot be broken up on a state-by-state basis and specific allocation
of income to a particular jurisdiction is not a sufficient basis for determining proper
division of income from a "unitary business," i.e., when the operation of the portion of
the business within the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the
business outside the state. G. ALTrmAN & F. K.MLINr, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE
TAXATION 101 (2d ed. 1950); Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act Re-Examined, 46 VA. L. REv. 1257, 1261 (1960). See also Goldstein, Allocation of Income
for Purposes of Corporate Taxation, 1 TAX L. REv. 149 (1946); Brookes, Allocation of
Income for Purposes of Corporate Taxation-Another View, 2 TAx L. Rv. 72 (1946);
Goldstein, Allocation of Income for Purposes of Corporate Taxation-A Reply, 2 TAX L.
REv. 80 (1946); REPORT 167.
Since separate accounting and specific allocation are unworkable as applied to many
enterprises because of the interrelatedness of their interstate and intrastate operations, all
jurisdictions provide for some kind of apportionment formula, Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined, 46 VA. L. REv. 1257, 1261, and the
achievement of an equitable and uniform solution in state apportionment looms as the
most pressing present problem in division of income. Furthermore, formula apportionment
is almost universally used to divide the base of a capital stock tax since separate accounting
is not authorized by any state and specific allocation plays only a minor role. REPORT 946.
The separate problem in income taxation of establishing a uniform definition of a tax
base (as distinguished from apportionment which is the problem of dividing that tax
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share of a corporation's net income, the Willis Subcommittee concluded
that "the present system for the division of income is characterized by
diversity and complexity,"' 1 9 that the "lack of consistency in the rules
for the division of income also raises the possibility of overtaxation and
undertaxation ... ,"io and that since "[t]he present system for division
of income is on its face overwhelming," it "will surprise no one familiar
with it that in practice it works badly.""' The Subcommittee concluded
that the existing system with the generalized use of a sales factor in the
apportionment formulas" 2 "has led to a bewildering maze of complications from which even the most eager taxpayer may be expected to
recoil."113
Although the Supreme Court has virtually abstained from interfering
with state apportionment formulas for nearly four decades," 4 two
recent decisions of the Court indicate that its long-standing policy of
non-interference may be changing. In both General Motors Corp. v.
District of Columbia"5 and Norfolk & Western Railway v. Missouri
State Tax Commission"n the Court struck down apportionment formulas, though only in the latter case did the decision rest on constitutional grounds.

17

The problem of apportionment is not new to the Supreme Court.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court handled
a number of apportionment cases arising from state capital stock and
property taxes levied on enterprises engaged in interstate transportation. The Court sustained rail mileage" 8 and comparable apportionbase) has not been an issue of great controversy. There has been almost no criticism of
the adoption of the federal definition of taxable income as set out in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 in the proposed Interstate Taxation Act. H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
§ 506(b) (1967).
109 REPORT 249.

11o Id.
ill

Id.

112 § 15 of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, which is now in use
in over twenty-five states, 29 J. TAx. 111 (1968), has the following definition of a sales
factor: "The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the
taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator of which is the total
sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period."
113 REPORT 248.

114 On only one occasion did the Supreme Court reverse a state court decision against
a taxpayer who was challenging the state's apportionment of net income. See Hans Rees'
Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Developments, 75 HARv.
L. REv. 953, 1014 (1962). See also Barnes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Nexus
and Apportionment, 48 MAEq. L. Rxv. 218, 221 (1964).
115 380 U.S. 553 (1965). The case is noted in 33 GEo. WAsH. L. R v. 785 (1965).
116 390 U.S. 317 (1968). The case is discussed in Wanamaker, Supreme Court Limits
Authority of States in Applying Apportionment Formulas,29 J. TAx. 54 (1968).
it See note 32 supra.
1i8 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
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ment devices 19 while striking down levies which it found to result in
extraterritorial taxation.120 After 1920, however, the Court grew in121
creasingly reluctant to find fault with state apportionment formulas,
a reluctance that continued through the 1940's and 1950's.122
It is in light of the Court's hands-off policy with respect to state apportionment formulas that the General Motors and Norfolk & Western
decisions assume an importance beyond their value as precedents. They
indicate that the Court is setting standards in an area long neglected.
In the General Motors case, the Court struck down a District of Columbia single-factor sales receipts formula used in its apportionment of a
net income tax base. The taxpayer claimed that the levy violated both
the District's statute authorizing it'23 and the due process and commerce clauses. Although the strict holding of the case was that the
24
the
District had failed to levy a tax as provided for in the statute,
reasoning of the Court would seem to cast a shadow over the constitutionality of any single-factor formula. Since the Court found that
the "geographic distribution of a corporation's sales is, by itself, of
dubious significance in indicating the locus" of "either a corporation's
sources of income or the social costs which it generates,"' 25 it would
119 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Adams Express Co.
v. Indiana, 165 U.S. 255 (1897). The apportionment in these cases included the corporation's intangibles.
120 Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919). The court found that the track
mileage apportionment formula resulted in a disproportionately large attribution of mileage traveled by the rolling stock of a railroad in a state when compared with the actual
mileage traveled, and it held the tax unconstitutional.
121 Though the Court was consistent in its constitutional approach, in practice the
standards adopted by the Court for establishing a commerce clause or due process clause
objection, see note 32 supra, to the state statute were such as to uphold virtually every
formula. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920), which marked
the beginning of the Court's noninterventionist policy with respect to state apportionment
formulas, the Court upheld a single-factor property formula over the corporation's objections to the gross disparity between the formulary and the actual value of its operations
in the state. The new judicial attitude was epitomized by Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co.,
291 U.S. 642 (193), where the Court sustained a North Carolina tax which allocated 99%
of a corporation's tax base to a state by means of a single-factor property formula,
although the taxpayer sold less than 1% of its products in the state.
122 John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 343 U.S. 939 (1952); Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). In both these cases, taxpayers' efforts to establish extraterritorial taxation resulting from states' apportionment formulas met with no success.
123 D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1580 (1961). The court quoted the pertinent portion of the
statute in the following manner: "'[t]he measure of the franchise tax shall be that portion
of the net income of the corporation . . . as is fairly attributableto any trade or business
carried on or engaged in within the District and such other net income as is derived from
sources within the District.'" General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 554
(1965) (emphasis is the Court's).
124 General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 880 U.S. 553, 555 (1965).
125 Id. at 561. With respect to the three-factor formula the Court said: "T]he
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appear (under the assumption that property or payroll "by itself' is
also of dubious value in indicating the source of a corporation's income)
that the Court's attitude toward any single-factor formula, and surely
any single-factor sales formula, would be equally hostile.
The Norfolk & Western decision, which rested specifically on constitutional grounds, is the latest piece of evidence indicating a renewed
judicial vigilance in controlling state apportionment. 26 Here a rail
mileage formula for determining the state's tax base with respect to the
railroad's property was struck down, 12T as the taxpayer demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the Court that the method employed by the tax
commissioner resulted in allocating a disproportionate amount of its
rolling stock to Missouri. In holding that Missouri had attempted to
overreach its constitutionally authorized taxing powers, Justice Fortas,
speaking for the majority said:
Our decisions recognize the practical difficulties involved and
do not require any close correspondence between the result
of computation using the mileage formula and the value of
property actually located in the state, but our cases certainly
forbid an unexplained discrepancy as gross as that in this case.
Such discrepancy certainly means that the impact of the state
property even within the
tax is not confined to intrastate
128
broad tolerance permitted.
Both General Motors and Norfolk & Western may reflect the Court's
reaction to recent criticism of its decisions in the state tax field 129 and
to congressional stirrings of discontent 30 over the inequitable operation
of existing state apportionment formulas. It is a healthy development:
the Court has finally begun to come to grips with the most troublesome
of issues in the area of state taxation of interstate commerce. - But it
must be recognized that the Court can only act to strike down apportioned taxes that violate constitutional restraints imposed upon the
states. As the Willis Report indicated,' 3 ' what is needed now to deal
with the complex and vexatious problems of apportionment is comprehensive legislation aimed at achieving an equitable and uniform system
standard three-factor formula can be justified as a rough, practical approximation of the
distribution of either a corporation's sources of income or the sodal costs which it generates." Id.
126 Cf. Wanamaker, Supreme Court Limits Authority of States in Applying Apportionment Formulas,29 J. TAx. 56 (1968).
127 390 U.S. 317 (1968).
128

Id. at 327.

129

See, e.g., Pierce, Form Versus Substance, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1150 (1960).

130

REroR 248.

131 Id.

at 11, 1128.
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of state taxation. Apportionment problems cannot be dealt with adequately merely by erecting constitutional restraints on state taxing
power. Only congressional or state reforms can achieve a comprehensive
solution.

The need for a uniform system of apportionment of state taxes is
widely recognized by those who are concerned with or affected by state
taxation of interstate commerce, but there is sharp disagreement over
how the job should be done. 13 2 Under the Interstate Taxation Act
passed by the House in May 1968, a state would be barred from applying
an income tax (or capital stock tax) apportionment formula when the
tax liability so computed would exceed liability as computed under
the formula based on two factors-property and payroll-set forth in
the bill.

133

The states, however, have been opposed to the congressionally prescribed formula. 134 Under the threat of federal restriction of their taxing
powers, they have moved with surprising speed toward an alternative
solution to the problem of state apportionment of corporate income
(and capital stock). This counterproposal to the Interstate Taxation Act
is embodied in the Multistate Tax Compact drafted by the Council of
State Governments, 135 first presented for the states' consideration in
1966.136 Fifteen states137 have become regular members of the Compact
and ten others 3 8 hold associate memberships. The Compact provides
taxpayers with an option to apportion income either under the method
provided by state law or by use of the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act,139 which is substantially adopted by the Compact. 140
Compare Harriss, Economic Aspects of Interstate Apportionment of Business income,
327, 362-63 (1959), and Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes
on Interstate Commerce: An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1121, 1131-32 (1960),
with Conlon, The Apportionment of Multistate Business Income: The NCCUSL Uniform
Division of Income Act, 12 TAx ExEc. 220, 229-80 (1960), Cox, The Interstate Tax Problem,
38 TAXEs 417,422-23 (1960), and Kust, State Taxation of InterstateIncome: New Dimensions
of an Old Problem, 12 TAx EXEc. 45, 60-61 (1959).
183 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201, 202 (1968).
134 See note 18 supra;see also 34 TAx Poucy (Nos. 7-8), 8, 4, (1967).
135 With the cooperation of the National Association of Tax Administrators, the National Association of Attorneys General and the National Legislative Conference.
136 29 STATE TAX Rav. (No. 24) 2 (1968).
137 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Action is pending in
Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. 29 J. TAx. 111 (1968).
138 Alaska, Arizona, California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, North Dakota, Permsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia. 29 STATE TAX Rav. (No. 24) 18 (1968).
139 The Uniform Division of Income For Tax Purposes Act is a proposal, worked out by
state tax administrators, lawyers, and accountants, aimed at achieving greater uniformity
132

37
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In effect, this would add to the property and payroll factors a receipts
factor now used by all the states with net income measures. The
Uniform Act's formula, already in use in more than one-half of the
states with income measures,141 provides for apportionment of business
42
income by the use of such a three-factor formula.1
The primary consideration in the current concern over apportionment is the achievement of uniformity. 143 The need for federal legislation to achieve this goal, however, must be re-evaluated in light of the
adoption by a rapidly increasing number of states of the Multi-State
Tax Compact and the enactment by the states of the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act. It can no longer be said, as it was four
years ago, that "the conclusion is inescapable that the voluntary adoption by the States of any kind of uniform system is a slow and halting
process if not a virtual impossibility."'144 The unprecedented state willingness to cooperate in face of the possibility of federal curbs on their
taxing power seems at this point to be achieving the very uniformity
at which the congressional bill is aimed. Furthermore, since the state
proposals are broader in scope than the congressional bill, a greater
degree of uniformity would be achieved by their enactment.
Apart from the substantive differences between the two proposals, a
state solution to the problem is probably preferable. When the states
are willing, as they now appear to be, to cooperate voluntarily in rationalizing the national system without the direct interference of the federal
government, the imposition of a federal standard upon the states for
in state taxation of interstate commerce. It was accepted in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, approved by the American Bar Association,
and adopted by twelve states, see note 141 infra, before it was in essence incorporated in
the Multi-State Tax Compact where it has received even more widespread acceptance.
140 Article III of the Multi-State Tax Compact gives the taxpayer the option to apportion and allocate with reference to state law or with reference to Article IV of the MultiState Compact, which adopts, practically verbatim, the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act.
141 The following states have adopted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Utah, and Virginia. 29 J. TAX. 111 (1968).
142 UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAx PuRPosEs AcT § 9.
143 PEpORT 128-133. Indeed, the importance of uniformity as a goal has long been
recognized. Id. at 129. "All methods of apportionment of trading profits are arbitrary ....
The only right rule of procedure is
There is no one right rule of apportionment ....
a rule on which the several states can and will get together as a matter of comity"-National Tax Association, Report of Committee on the Apportionment Between States of
Taxes on Mercantile and ManufacturingBusiness, 1922 PROCEEDINGS 198, 201; REPORT 130or which Congress will impose on the states. Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a
National Economy, 54 HAxv. L. REV. 949, 962 (1941).
144 REPORT 133.
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the purpose of achieving the same result is not only superfluous but
also tends to discourage the states from taking the kind of initiative
that adds vitality to the federal system.
Of course, uniformity is not the only goal. Consideration must be
given the relative merits of the congressional and state formulas. The
Subcommittee's recommendation of a two-factor rather than a threefactor formula was based primarily on two conclusions: the receipts
factor seemed to provide the most severe compliance and administrative
difficulties, 145 and it appeared to make very little difference from the
point of view of state revenue whether a three-factor or a two-factor
formula was used.146 The states' opposition to the Interstate Taxation
Act's apportionment provisions, on the other hand, has been justified
on several grounds. 47 The states, in their understandable concern with
upsetting the balance of federalism, contend that they, and they alone,
ought to prescribe the formula governing the apportionment of income
to the states.' 48 Moreover, notwithstanding the Subcommitee's conclusion that the abandonment of the receipts factor would have little
revenue significance, many states fear a diminution in their tax revenues as a result of the bill. 49 Finally, those states fearing a loss of
revenue feel that the Subcommittee had ignored the claim of the market
state to a fair share of the tax revenues from interstate businesses enjoying the opportunities and protection which those states afforded.8 0
145 Id. at 247-9.
146 id. at 560-3.
147 See note 18 supra. See generally, 34 TAx POLicy (Nos. 7-8) (1967); Conlon, The
Apportionment of Multi-State Business Income: The NCCUSL Uniform Division of Income
Act, 12 TAx ExEc. 220 (1960); Cox, The Interstate Tax Problem, 38 TAXFS 417 (1960); Kust,
State Taxation of Interstate Income: New Dimensions of an Old Problem, 12 TAX ExEc. 45
(1959).
148 The Honorable William H. Avery, Governor of Kansas, strongly expressed this
concern with the federal balance: "At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear
that the State of Kansas is unequivocally opposed to H.R. 11798 and any other attempted
Federal intervention into the tax and fiscal policies of our State . .. [I]t is the belief and
the conviction of the executive and legislative branches of the government of the State of
Kansas that bills such as H.R. 11798 are erosions of the principles of federalism which
have served as a basis for our government since its inception." Hearings 1220.
149 Francis Hillard, Member of the Wyoming Board of Equalization, declared: "Wyoming is very much a consumer State and has very little industry. Thus we believe the
deletion of a sales factor was a grave mistake and tremendously detrimental to such states
as Wyoming ...
[Contrary to your findings, the elimination of this factor would make
a tremendous difference to the States like Wyoming . . ." Hearings 715, 716.
Governor Grant Sawyer of Nevada, on behalf of the Western Governors' Conference,
stated: "[E]nactment of H.R. 11798 [more recently H.R. 2158] or similar legislation would
have a profound impact on the revenues, revenue structures, and hence the economy of
each of the several States represented in the Western Governors' Conference." Hearings265.
150 Governor Grant Sawyer of Nevada, on behalf of the Western Governors' Conference,
stated: "I might observe that it seems ironic that the bills you have before you give such
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The primary argument made in favor of dropping the receipts factor
from the congressional formula is that the receipts factor is the source
of the complexities of the present system of apportionment resulting in
"noncompliance and in the inequities which come with a tax system
in which formal requirements have been abandoned."' 51 The receipts
factor, varying in form from state to state, was found to add unjustifiably to record-keeping costs. 1 52 The fear that such costs would become
burdensome if there were rigid enforcement of the three-factor formula
led the Subcommittee to recommend the two-factor formula which had
153
the virtue of simplicity.
It would seem, however, that if Congress or the states were to adopt
a uniform apportionment formula (regardless of the particular formula
adopted), many other complexities would disappear. First, since there
would be only one standard formula applicable to the apportionment
of all state net income and capital stock taxes, the costs and difficulties
of complying with a multitude of different receipts formulas would be
diminished substantially. 154 Second, the inequities resulting from a
variety of apportionment formulas inconsistently enforced would no
longer exist if there were but one formula, whether designed by the
states or by Congress. Third, the Subcommittee's argument that smaller
interstate businesses would be subjected to an onerous and costly
burden by the adoption of a formula with a receipts factor' 55 loses much
of its force in light of the sales tax provision of the Interstate Taxation
Act, 56 which would require a great many interstate vendors to maintain the very records that the income apportionment provision theoretically makes unnecessary. 5 7 In short, the Subcommittee's solution is in
short shrift to the contribution the market State makes in the production of income. Your
stated interest lies in the protection of businesses engaged in interstate commerce. Yet for
purposes of taxation these bills ignore or give very little weight to what is essential to
such a business-the availability of markets in States other than the State in which it
has a 'business location.'" Hearings 266.
151 REPopT 334, 384.
152 Id. at 382.
153 Id. at 1135.
154 Hearings 1074.
155 RFORT 528, 563. The Report acknowledges that "For most of the larger interstate
companies . . . it would appear that the cost of computing a sales factor can be kept
within reasonable limits no matter which of the factors should be adopted, although there
are undoubtedly some exceptions to the general rule." Id. at 528.
156 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 501 (1968), permits the states to impose a sales
tax or to require that a seller collect a use tax with respect to an interstate sale only if
the destination of the sale is in that state or in the state in which the tax is required
to be collected.
157 Any state enacting the federally prescribed sales and use tax law with the sales
destination test would require the interstate vendor to record the destination of the sales
made, in which case the computation of a sales factor in an income or capital stock tax
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many respects no less complex nor less costly than that of the states, and
it would appear that in the face of strong state sentiment for retaining
the receipts factor, the Congress should re-evaluate the House's rejection of the three-factor formula before imposing significant structural
changes on the existing state apportionment methods.
As for the revenue consequences of adopting the two-factor formula,
serious doubts may be raised about the Subcommitee's conclusion that
the choice of a two- or three-factor formula would have little impact
on state revenues. 5 This conclusion is unwarranted because the Subcommittee Report measures revenue significance by the percentage
impact on all fifty states' total tax revenues. 59 But the differential impact of the two- and three-factor formulas on any single state's net
income tax revenue may be enormous: North Dakota's corporate income
tax would be reduced by 47 per cent; Idaho, the District of Columbia,
and New Mexico by over twenty per cent; and six other states by ten
to nineteen per cent. 60 Dollar losses would also be significant in many
cases: Mississippi and Montana would lose half a million dollars each,
Minnesota about $1.7 million and New York $13 million.'81 The heavy
industrial states would stand to gain from the introduction of a standardized two-factor formula. 162 Viewed in terms of its effect on the
revenue which particular states derive from manufacturing and mercantile companies, the choice of a formula would in some cases have
substantial effects. 163
In short, to evaluate the revenue impact of varying apportionment
formulas by the impact upon total revenues from all state taxes is to
dilute the results and underestimate the revenue effect upon the states.
The adoption of a two-factor rather than the three-factor formula
would tend to upset the present distribution of corporate income tax
revenues to the detriment of the market states. It would thus tend to
divert revenue to those states with the greatest concentrations of labor
and capital.
Whether there ought to be such a redistribution of tax revenue among
the states may depend on the extent to which one associates the selling
apportionment formula would not be a great additional burden. It must be recognized,
however, that many manufacturers and wholesalers sell only goods which are ordinarily
not subject to a state sales tax and would therefore not be required to keep these records
in the absence of a sales factor in the formula. Hearings 1074.
158 See, e.g., Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Businesses,
20 TAx L. REV. 259, 267-76 (1965); 34 TAx POLICY (Nos. 7-8) 3,4 (1967).
159 REPORT 545; see Hearings 1072-3.
160 REPORT

Chart 16-A, 540-I.

16' REPoRT A493-8; see Hearings 1078.
162 REP ORT A493-503; see Hearings 1073.
163 REPORT 539.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:186

process with the production of income. One commentator succinctly
expressed the "economic" justification behind the desire to abandon
the sales factor in the computation of a state's income tax base:
One basic principle lies at the heart of it: "Income may be
defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor or from
both combined ... ." Accordingly, the ideal formula never
includes a receipts factor. 6 4
Irrespective of the questionable analytical validity of this proposition,'6 5
when one turns to the actual operations of an interstate business in the
marketplace, the influence of the sales process on the income of a corporation would appear to extend beyond the factors of capital and
labor which are committed to sales. The large profits derived from
sales of goods in any state may be due to population increases, a rising
standard of living, the general expansion of our economy, and a number
of other factors which may be only remotely related to the capital and
labor a corporation allocates to selling in that state.166 Moreover, the ten
billion dollars spent annually for advertising to exploit the marketplace
would seem to indicate that the market qua market has an economic
importance which may far exceed the value of the property and payroll
located in a particular taxing jurisdiction.167 From this point of view,
an apportionment formula which failed to include a sales factor would
tend to distort the tax base adversely against the economic contribution
made by the market state in the income creation process since it would
be only fortuitous if the distribution of a corporation's payroll and
property were identical to the distribution of its sales.
In the final analysis, practical considerations of optimum revenue
distribution among the states may be the best justification for retaining
the three-factor formula favored by the states rather than adopting the
congressional two-factor formula. Only if there is a receipts factor will
the market state in which an interstate business has little property and
few employees be able to share in the tax revenues from the interstate
164 Barnes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Nexus and Apportionment, 48 MARQ.
L. REV. 218, 223 (1964). Barnes continues: "For manufacturing, it might be tangible
productive property (capital) and payroll (labor). For merchandising, it might be inventory
(capital) and payroll (labor). For financing, it might be intangibles (capital) and payroll
(labor). For transportation, it might be tangible property (capital) and payroll (labor)." Id.
165 P. SAMUE.SON, ECONoMIcs, AN INTRODUcfORY ANALYSIS, pts. 3, 4 (5th ed. 1961).
166 Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 20 TAx
L. R v. 259, 274-5 (1965). Professor Hellerstein writes: "For example, during World War II
the prices of second hand cars and the profits from their sale increased sharply in this
country, not because of added capital or labor costs, but simply because new cars were
no longer produced." Id.
167

Id. at 276.
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business which exploits its market. The presence of a market also indicates the presence of people with governmental needs. One of the
primary sources of state tax revenues to meet these needs are corporate
income and capital stock taxes.16 Another argument, then, in favor of
retaining the receipts factor is that it distributes tax revenues where
they are needed to meet the costs of government. Despite the simplicity
of this argument, it is a compelling one if one considers revenue distribution in terms of need only, ignoring, for the moment, the question of
recompense for benefit conferred. The states are currently facing severe
financial crises, with increasing pressures on them to meet burgeoning
demands for schools, roads, hospitals, welfare, and police and fire protection, and to expand their roles in dealing with housing, juvenile
delinquency, mental health and other problems. These are demands
which must be met by market states no less than by industrial states.
The inclusion of a sales factor will permit the market states to obtain
at least their present share of the tax revenues from interstate business-revenues which the abolition of a sales factor would substantially
reduce.

169

Only if there is a receipts factor will the market state be recompensed
by interstate business for the protection of its laws and the benefits of
its market. One critic of the congressional proposal expressed this view
strongly:
...

H.R. 11798 [now H.R. 2158, as amended] ignores a very

basic and fundamental principle recognized by the courts, and
that is, the marketing State should be able to collect its fair
share of the taxes for the contributions it makes to the final
sale of the products. The State of destination provides the
marketplace for the multistate business to operate. It creates
the economic climate conducive for business operations. It
accords the multistate businesses the many tax-supported
services and protection. Yet, by the application of the business
location test and state of origin test set forth in the bill, the
marketing state may not in every case assert its jurisdiction.
The use of independent contractors in lieu of employees who
operate their business from personal residence is just such an
example. 7 0
168 Corporate income taxes produce about 9% of the total revenue of the states which
have such taxes. REPORT 108, Table 5-3 110-111. Capital stock taxes produce about 3% of
the total revenue of the states which have such taxes. REPORT 909, Table 29-3 910.
169 Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 20
TAx L. REv. 259, 269 (1965).
170 Hearings 1008 (testimony of Allen Marutani, Special Deputy Attorney General of
Hawaii); cf. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate, Comm. on Finance, State Taxation of Interstate
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Finally, it should be noted that the states in which large permanent
installations of interstate businesses are located, the states in which
manufacturing and warehousing are carried on, the states in which the
heavy concentrations of executive and administrative personnel are
found presently enjoy a heavy weighting in state apportionment formulas. Hence, even with the general use of a receipts factor, these states
derive the major share of existing tax measures.17 1 It seems entirely
justifiable to include a sales factor, which has a weight of only one-third
in determining the total tax base, which can be supported both in terms
of economic benefit conferred by the taxing state and in terms of
optimum revenue distribution, and without which the market state
would suffer substantial losses in corporate income and capital stock tax
revenue.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Roadway Express, which narrows the tax immunity afforded the privilege of doing interstate business to insignificance, indicates that exclusively interstate commerce may be taxed either if a state tax statute prescribes a direct income tax as in Northwestern or if the state court is
careful in distinguishing its statute from the Connecticut statute struck
down in Spector. An analysis of other state statutes suggests that the
approach followed in Roadway Express may be used by other states as
well, to broaden their taxing powers to reach exclusively interstate
businesses. At the same time, such an analysis demonstrates that the
privilege concept is no longer a relevant frame of reference for dealing
with the critical issues confronting state taxation of interstate commerce.
Once it is recognized that interstate businesses may legitimately be
taxed by the states, the crucial issue becomes the method of state taxation. One of the most complex problems concerns state formulas apportioning income or capital stock of multi-state corporations among the
Commerce, Hearings on S. 2524 at 31-32 (1959), where Senator Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.)
said:
A corporation which employs capital and labor and operates facilities within
a State is an integral part of that State's economy and receives a variety of protective and other services for which the State should be compensated. Since these
services directly relate to the income-producing activities of the company, a tax
on income allocated to these activities is patently reasonable. On the other hand,
a company which does not have a place of business in a State does not receive
any benefits from the State which relate to its income producing activities. Such
a State does not put out a fire on the company's premises, it does not insure its
employees against injury on the job, it does not protect its warehouses, it does
not maintain the streets and highways or subways and utilities needed for the
company's functioning. The fact that the property of such a foreign corporation
is delivered to one of its citizens may justify a sales or use tax, but it does not
justify a tax on the net income of the company.
171 REPORT A477-509; Hellerstein, An Academician's View of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 16 TAx. L. Rxv 159, 175 (1961).

1968]

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce

219

states. The diversity and inconsistency in present state formulas have
led to inequities in the system. Although the Supreme Court has
recently indicated a renewed concern with the problem, what is needed
is a comprehensive solution beyond the purview of the Court. Two
proposals, the congressional Interstate Taxation Act and the Multi-State
Tax Compact, support differing uniform methods of apportionment.
Since congressional fears of high costs of compliance with the threefactor formula are probably exaggerated, and since the revenue effects
on the states of the adoption of the congressional two-factor formula
would be considerable, the three-factor formula, which allows the
market state to tap larger sources of revenue from interstate business,
is preferable.

